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THE URBAN COUNTY:
KENTUCKY'S NEW STRUCTURE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Few problems have received greater attention in recent years
in Congress and in state legislatures than have the many problems
of governing our large metropolitan areas. One response has been
an increase in efforts to provide new structures of local government
which are better suited to cope with the exigencies of modem urban
life than were their predecessors. As evidenced by the number and
variety of innovative plans for metropolitan reform,' this effort has
not been wasted. In Kentucky, the push for reform in local government resulted in the passage of the Peak-McCann Act2 in 1970 by
the Kentucky General Assembly. The express purpose of that Act,
which is now codified in Chapter 67A of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes,is
to facilitate the operation of local government, to prevent duplication of services, and to promote efficient and economical management of the affairs of local government. ....3
Although it is perhaps overly restrictive in its scope and somewhat
misguided in various procedural aspects, this statute represents a
progressive and enlightened approach to local governmental reform.
Chapter 67A is significant in two respects: (1) It provides for the
consolidation of city and county governments into a new form of
government called the urban county; and (2) it delegates home rule
powers to the citizens of the cities and counties which elect to so
consolidate. In order critically to evaluate the Kentucky statute, it is
necessary to examine the development and present status of the concepts of "home rule" and "city-county consolidation." In addition, a
comparison of Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 67 [hereinafter
referred to as KRS] will serve to illustrate both the strong points of
that may befall those who
the Kentucky law and some of the difficulties
4
guidelines.
its
under
proceed
to
attempt
1 See Dixon, New Constitutional Forms of Metropolis, 30 LAW & CONTEIP.

PnoB. 57, 63 (1965); Makielski, City-County Consolidation in the United States,
46 U.2 VA. NEWSL.rriR 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Makielski].
Ky.Acrs, ch. 268 (1970).
3 Ky. REv. STAT. § 67A.010 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
4 This Comment will not present a line-by-line analysis of KRS § 67A.010040; rather it will focus on the overall importance of the statute and some of the
partcularly troublesome questions that are raised by a careful consideration of its
provisions.
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I. HOME Ruim5

The establishment of local autonomy by municipalities in many
states has been an extremely difficult task, due largely to the vitality
of 'Dillon's law" or the "creature theory" as a basic constitutional

doctrine.6 This doctrine, as first enunciated in the case of City of
Clinton v. CedarRapids & Mo. R. R.R.,7 holds that municipal corporations are creatures of the state and that they owe their origin to and
derive their powers and rights from the legislature.8 Typical of the

decisions rendered under this rule is Dortch v. Lugar,9 in which,
despite the existence of a state constitutional provision declaring that
the right to alter and reform the government is inherent in the people,10

the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a legislatively imposed consolidation of the governments of Indianapolis and Marion County. 1 In its
ruling, the court maintained that
Subordinate divisions of the government are but parts of the state
government as a whole. The state, by its legislature, may abolish,
consolidate, combine, eliminate, or create new governmental corporations, or authorize such alterations to govern those who live in a
given area. There is no constitutional guarantee for the continued
existence of a governmental12subdivision of the state. They are all
creatures of the legislature.
The principal legal device employed by municipalities and other
units of local government to obtain some measure of freedom from
state control is generally known as "home rule." 3

The great number

of variations of and sources of authority for home rule make broad
generalizations about the doctrine almost impossible. Still, for most
purposes, "home rule" can be adequately and accurately defined as
"the autonomy of local government in the sovereign state over all
purely local matters. ..
"14 This description generally holds true
r The following discussion of home rule is not intended as a thorough
analysis of that subject, which in and of itself provides ample material for a
paper of considerable length. It is included herein only in such detail as is
deemed necessary to enable the reader to properly conceptualize and evaluate the
delegation of power to local governmental units contained in KRS § 67A.020.
6 See Lineberry, Reforming Metropolitan Governance: Requiem or Reality, 58
GEo. L.J. 675, 685 n.47 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as Lineberry].
78 24 Iowa 455 (1868).
Lineberry 685.
90266 N.E.2d 25 (Ind. 1971).
1 IND. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
11266 N.E.2d at 44.
12 Id.
13 Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule In The United States, 10 WM. &
MAnY L. R1v. 269 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Vanlandingham].
14 Id. at 280.
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whether one is concerned with "constitutional home rule states" or
with "legislature home rule states."
A. ConstitutionalHome Rule
Constitutional home rule was first authorized in 1875 by Article
IX, Section 16 of the Missouri Constitution. Therein, it was provided
that any city with a population greater than 100,000 could "frame and
adopt a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject
to the Constitution and laws of the State."15 At present, thirty-three
state constitutions contain home rule provisions, 6 most of which were
adopted during one or the other of two distinct historical periods.
In the so-called "formative period" (1875 to 1912), eleven states
adopted home rule constitutional provisions' 7 and in the8 post-World
War II era fourteen states have adopted such provisions.1
Constitutional home rule provisions fall into three basic categories:
self-executing, mandatory, and permissive. 19 Self-executing provisions,
such as those of Colorado, 20 California, 21 Nebraska, 22 Arizona,23 and
Washington, 24 enable a city to adopt and exercise home rule powers
immediately without the necessity of implementing legislation. 25 A
mandatory home rule provision such as is found in the constitution of
North Dakota,26 states that the legislature "shall enact implementing
legislation to provide for home rule adoption."27 A permissive home
rule provision, on the other hand, merely provides that the legislature
at its discretion may enact home rule legislation.28 Such provisions
are found in the constitutions of Georgia, 29 New Hampshire, 30 and
Hawaii.8 '
In "self-executing" and "mandatory" constitutional home rule states,
the constitutional position of the cities vis-a-vis the state legislature
IX, § 16 (1875).
16 Vanlandmgham 277.
17 Vanlandingham 277. Among the states which enacted constitutional home
rule provisions in this era are California, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri
and Texas.
18 Vanlandingham 277. Included in this group are Alaska, Florida, Hawaii,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico and North Dakota.
19 Lineberry 686 n.48; Vanlandingharn 278.
20 COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1.
15 Mo. CONST. art.

21 CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6-20.
22
28
24

NEB. CONST. art. XI,§
AmZ. CONST. art.

2-5.

XIII, §§ 2-5.

WASH. CONST. art. XI, §§ 10-11.
25 Pitts v. Allen, 281 P. 126, 132 (Okla. 1929).

26
N.DAx. CONST. § 130.
27
Vanlandingham 278; see N. DAx. CONST. § 130.
28
Vanlandingham 278.
20
GA.CONST. art. XV.
3O'N.H. CONST. Part I, art. XXXIX.
81 HAwAu CONST. art. VII, §§ 1-15.
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has been altered 3 2 and the legislatures are deemed powerless to interfere with the cities' conduct of municipal affairs.3 3 Of particular
importance, the legislature cannot alter, modify, or merge such home
rule cities without the consent of the affected electorate.3 4 In contrast,
in permissive constitutional home rule states, in legislative home rule
states, and in those states which do not allow home rule of any sort, the
legislature retains considerable control over the affairs of local government, including the area of local government consolidation. 5
The traditional method for initiating home rule in constitutional
home rule states (and in many legislative home rule states) has been
the adoption of a charter.36 Indeed, in most instances, the adoption
of charters or municipal constitutions drafted by local charter commissions which have been selected pursuant to constitutional guidelines is a prerequisite to exercising home rule powers3T Not surprisingly, one of the great conflicts surrounding the implementation of
constitutional home rule provisions has concerned the proper relationship between the terms of these charters and the dictates of general
statutes of the state which are inconsistent with them. In some state
constitutions, this issue is settled conclusively in favor of the local
governments, giving them powers in local affairs superior to the
general laws of the state. Such provisions,38 which are characteristic
of most constitutional home rule provisions enacted in the "formative
period" (1875 to 1912),3 9 expressly recognize the doctrine of imperio
in imperium. This doctrine, first enunciated in a case involving the
Missouri constitutional provision,4" provides that there are certain
areas, usually described as those of "purely local concern," within
which the charter is supreme over state laws. 41 States which accept
the validity of imperio in imperium, either expressly in their constitutions or in their courts' interpretations thereof, 42 grant to units of
local government complete home rule.
3

2 Vanlandingham 280.

Consumers Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 189 N.W. 643 (Neb. 1922); Lineberry 686. The legislature in such cases is prohibited from interfering to the
extent that the constitutional provision establishes home rule. As will be discussed
later, however, complete home rule (such as is contemplated by the definition
in the3 text accompanying note 14, supra) is not always granted.
4Fragley v. Phelan, 58 P. 923, 925 (Cal. 1899).
335 See Dortch v. Lugar, 266 N.E.2d 25 (Ind. 1971).
0 Vanlandingham 280; e.g., CAL. CoNsr. art. XI, §§ 6-20; COLO. CONST. art.
XX, §37 1-6; WASH. CONST. art. XI, §§ 10-11.
Vanlandingham 280; see WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 10.
38
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6-20.
3
9Vanlandingham 280.
40 St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465 (1893).
41
Vanlandingham 280.
42
St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465 (1893); Mollner v. City
of Omaha, 98 N.W.2d 33 (Neb. 1959).
33
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On the other hand, many state constitutional home rule provisions,
particularly those enacted since 1912, emphasize legislative supremacy.
For example, Article XIV, Section 40 of the Louisiana Constitution,
adopted in 1952, grants home rule to municipalities in the area of
"local affairs, property, and government" but provides that:
The provisions of this Constitution and any general laws passed
by the legislature shall be paramount and no municipality shall
exercise any
power or authority which is inconsistent or in conflict
43
therewith.
In such states the permissible range of local autonomy is thereby
considerably reduced unless the legislature, in spite of the constitutionally authorized opportunity to intervene, adopts a policy of non44
interference.

B. Legislative Home Rule
Legislative home rule exists where-in the absence of a constitutional home rule provision-the legislature empowers the units of
local government to adopt and exercise home rule powers. The validity
of such delegations of power was upheld in Barnes v. District of
Columbia,45 in which the United States Supreme Court declared:
A municipal corporation, in the exercise of all its duties, including
those most strictly local or internal, is but a department of the
state. The legislature may give it all the powers such a being is
capable
of receiving, making it a miniature state within its lo46
cality.
In spite of this, the power of the Kentucky General Assembly to
delegate home rule to urban counties in the absence of constitutional
authority to do so was challenged on two grounds in Pinchback v.
Stephens.47 The first challenge was based on Section 60 of the Kentucky Constitution, the applicable portion of which states:
No law, except such as relates to the sale, loan or gift of vinous,
spiritous or malt liquors, bridges, turnpikes or other public roads,
public buildings or improvements, fencing, running at large of
stock, matters pertaining to common schools, paupers, and the
regulation of counties, cities, towns or other municipalities of their
local affairs, shall be enacted to take effect upon the approval of
any other authority than the general 48
assembly, unless otherwise
expressly provided in this Constitution.
4
3 LA. CONsT.
44

art. XIV, § 40.
See Lineberry 685-86; Vanlandingham 278-80.

45 91 U.S. 540 (1875).
46 Id. at 544.
47484
48

Ky.

S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1972).
CONST. § 60.
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The Court of Appeals resolved this issue by calling attention to the
fact that one of the areas expressly excluded from the application of

Section 60's prohibition is "the regulation of counties, cities, and towns
and other municipalities in their local affairs." 49 The Court could have
added additional support to its conclusion by relying, as did Fayette
Circuit Court Judge James Park,5 0 on Bryan v. Voss 51 in which it was

held that:
if the words 'regulation by counties, cities, towns or other
municipalities of their local affairs' were not intended to include the
matter of local self-government, we can hardly see why these words
were inserted in the section after the other things which were
named. 52
The second challenge to the home rule grant of KRS Chapter 67A
raised in Pinchback v. Stephens went directly to the heart of the

concept of legislative home rule by asserting that, without a constitutional mandate, the legislature was powerless to grant home rule.
In response to this proposition the Court merely declared that:
Absent any all-inclusive, straight-out prohibition in our Constitution
against the grant to local voters of any power of self-government in
regard to the structure of local government, this Court is not disposed to bar the door to any and all possibility of action in this
53
area.

Once again, one must look to the opinion of the Circuit Court to
find a less equivocal, better-supported statement of the rules of law
applicable to the question raised. Therein, the court relies upon the
constitutional principles delineated in Boone County v. Town of
Verona, 4 that if the General Assembly is not prohibitedfrom enacting
the particular type of legislation by a constitutional provision, it may
do so.rm Since there is no provision in the Kentucky Constitution
49 Pinchback v. Stephens, 484 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Ky. 1972).

GOPinchback v. Stephens, No. 31461 (Fayette Cir. Ct. 1972).
136 S.W. 884 (Ky. 1911).

51
52

Id.at 886.

53 484 S.W.2d 327, 330.
54 227 S.W. 804, 805 (Ky. 1921).
55
At page 4 of Judge Park's opinion is inserted the following language from

Boone at 805:

The contention is made for the appellant that the foregoing act of the
General Assembly is void, because in violation of certain provisions of the
Constitution. A very well-settled principle, which has been continuously adhered to, is that the General Assembly has the authority to
enact any legislation which is not prohibited by some provision of the
Constitution of the state or of the United States, and in this respect a
difference arises between the powers of the General Assembly of the state
and the powers of the Congress of the United States. The powers of the
latter in legislation are confined to such things as it is authorized by the
(Continued on next page)
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which denies the legislature the power to establish home rule, then
it follows that the enactment of KRS Chapter 67A is not invalid.
Home rule statutes, including KRS Chapter 67A,5 6 enacted pursuant to neither constitutional mandate nor authorization, may be
classified according to the sources of the respective home rule charters,
the body responsible for final approval of those charters, and the scope
of the powers delegated thereunder. Under most legislative home
rule statutes the charters are to be drafted by the municipalities themselves. 57 In some of these, the charters are prepared by an appointed
or elected charter commission, 58 but in other cases the charter or
amendments thereto may, alternatively, be proposed by the governing
body of the municipality,5 9 or by petition of a specified portion of the
electorate. 0 Local charter commissions, governing bodies and groups
of voters are not, however, the only residuaries of the power to
promulgate local charters. In New Jersey, for example, the local voters
merely have the opportunity to choose from among fifteen optional
plans of local government set out in the New Jersey home rule
statute.0 1
As shown by the preceeding text and footnotes, KRS Chapter 67A
falls within the category of home rule statutes that provide for the
promulgation of charters by local charter commissions. It provides
that, upon proper petition by citizens of the city and county,
...the fiscal court and the council of the largest city within the
county shall appoint a representative commission composed of not
shall devise a comprehensive
less than twenty (20) citizens which
plan of urban county government.0 2
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

provisions of the Constitution of the United States to do. . . . While
there is no express warrant in the Constitution of the state for the enact-

ment of the legislation contained in the act supra, such warrant is no
wise essential to its validity, and hence, if the General Assembly is not
prohibited from enacting the legislation by a constitutional provision, it
was wholly within its power to do so.
56 KRS § 83.011, a former statute, is also listed as an example of legislative
home rule. Repealed Ky. AcTs. ch. 243 (1972).
57 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 801-36 (Supp. 1970); KBS §§ 67A.010-.040
(Supp. 1972); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 21-17-9 to -13 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. H9
14-14-1 to -14 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 702(a) (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE
ANN. 5 8§§ 15.1-833 to -837 (1973).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 801-36 (Supp. 1970); KRS §§ 67A.010-.040
(Supp.
1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-14-1 to -14 (1968).
59
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 801-36 (Supp. 1970); Miss. CODE ANN. 99
to -13 (1972).
21-17-9
60
Miss. CODE AN.

§§

21-17-9 to -13 (1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,

§

702(a)

(Supp. 1973). This type of petition should not be confused with that authorized
in KRS § 67A.020. In the Kentucky statute the petition is only for the appointment
of a charter commission. In Mississippi and Vermont, however, the voters may
actually petition that a specific charter or charter amendment be adopted.
61 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 40:69A-1 to -210 (1967).
62 KRS § 67A.020 (Supp. 1972).
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This represents a notable departure from KRS § 83.011, Kentucky's
only previous venture into home rule, wherein the legislature made
no provision for local charters but merely authorized and empowered
all first class cities to
*.. exercise all the rights, powers, franchises, and privileges not in
conflict with any statute now or hereafter enacted which such legislative body [of the city] shall deem requisite for the welfare of the
inhabitants of such city, and for the effectual administration of all
local government... within its territorial limits.... 63
Statutory provisions in legislative home rule states, as noted above,
also differ considerably as to the delegation of responsibility for the
final approval of home rule charters. Understandably such power is
often retained by the legislatures themselves6 4 in order to keep municipalities from getting "too independent." Mississippi offers a considerably different approach in providing that after approval by the
electorate, local charters must be sent to the governor, who, with the
assistance of the state attorney general, decides whether or not the
charters are consistent with the United States Constitution and laws
and the state constitution, and approves or disapproves the documents accordingly. 65 In New Mexico, 66 Delaware, 67 and Kentucky,68
however, approval of the proposed charter by the local electorate is
final and subject to no further ratification.
A final categorization of home rule statutes can be made according
to the scope of the powers delegated therein. In those states which
require final charter approval by the legislature or which only allow
the electorate to choose from among several already delineated
structures, this question is of little consequence; their municipalities
always remain within the close supervision of the legislature. Elsewhere, the question is one of much greater importance. In Mississippi
the provisions of home rule charters must be consistent with the
United States Constitution and laws and the state constitution and
must not be in conflict with any general state laws applicable to
municipalities operating under the private or special charters. 69 Other
statutes allow home rule municipalities to exercise all powers not in
conflict with the general laws of the state and specifically declare that
the statutes are to be construed as giving to such local units all the
KRS § 83.011 (repealed Ky. Acs ch. 243 1972).
§ 702(a) (1967); VA. CODE
-837 65(1973).
Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-17-9 to -13 (1972).
66 N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 14-14-1 to -14 (1968).
67 DEL.CODE ANN. tit.
22, §§ 801-36 (Supp. 1970).
6SKRS §§ 67A.010-.040 (Supp. 1972).
63

64VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,

69 Miss. CODE ANN.

§ 21-17-9 (19712).

ANN. §§ 15.1-833 to
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authority that it is within the power of the legislature to grant.7
New Mexico appears to be the only legislative home rule state which
expressly incorporates the doctrine of imperio in imperium in its
home rule statute. The only restriction placed upon home rule charters
in that state is that they
shall not be inconsistent with the Constitution of New Mexico,
shall not authorize the levy of any tax not specifically authorized
by the laws of the state and shall not authorize
the expenditure of
71
public funds for other than public purposes.
The statute further states that a municipal corporation organized
under its terms "shall be governed by the provisions of the charter
adopted pursuant to"72 those terms and that "no law relating to
municipalities inconsistent with the provisions of the charter shall
apply to any such municipality."73
It is quite possible that the Kentucky General Assembly has also
incorporated the doctrine of imperio in imperium into KRS Chapter
67A, although by implication rather than express directive. The applicable portion of KRS § 67A.020 reads:
. ..the fiscal court and the council of the largest city within the
county shall appoint a representative commission composed of not
less than twenty (20) citizens which shall devise a comprehensive
plan of urban county government. The plan shall include a de-

scription of the form, structure, functions, powers, and officers and
their duties of the proposed urban county government; the procedures by which the original plan may be amended; and such

other provisions as the commission shall determine; and shall be
consistent with the provisions of the constitution of Kentucky.7 4
From the foregoing section it is evident that the only express restriction
on the provisions of urban county government charters is that they
must be consistent with the Kentucky Constitution. In that respect it
is almost identical to the New Mexico statute; the fact that it does not
clarify the position of the urban county government charter relative
to general state laws (as does the New Mexico statute) is perhaps
frustrating but it is not surprising, 75 and it does not prevent the con70

See, e.g., DEL. CoDe ANN. tit. 22, § 802 (Supp. 1970).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-14-5 (1968).
72 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-14-11 (1968).
73 Id. (emphasis added).
7
4KRS § 67A.020 (Supp. 1972). The portion given emphasis was not a part
of the law as originally enacted in 1970 but was added as an amendment in 1972.
Ky. AcTs. ch. 257 (1972) (emphasis added).
75 In fact, this is but one of several parts of KRS Chapter 67A which seem to
have been left purposely vague, bequeathing to the court the task of discerning
the intent of the legislature and the application of existing laws in order to fill in
the gaps.
71
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elusion that the intent of the Kentucky General Assembly was identical
with that of the New Mexico legislature.
Two lines of argument support the foregoing assertion. First, a
comparison of the language of KRS § 67A.020 with that of previously
enacted Kentucky statutes indicates a radical and probably significant
departure on the part of the more recent statute. KRS § 67A.020,
unlike KRS § 83.011, does not impose upon charters enacted pursuant
to its provisions the restriction that they may not conflict with "any
statute now or hereafter enacted." A careful reading of KRS § 83.010
and KRS § 84.010, the statutes in which the power to enact local
ordinances is delegated to first and second class cities respectively,
is also instructive in this regard. The first sentence in KRS § 83.010,
which is identical in all pertinent respects to that of KRS § 84.010,
provides that:
the inhabitants of each city of the first class shall constitute a
corporation, with power to govern themselves by ordinances and
resolutions for the municipal purposes not in conflict with
the
78
constitution and laws of this state or of the United States.

The difference between these statutes and KRS § 67A.020 is undeniable and may well support the conclusion that the General Assembly intended urban counties to exercise broader control over local
affairs than is possible in any of the traditional structures of local government in Kentucky.
A second line of reasoning in support of this conclusion is offered
by the Fayette Circuit Court in Pinchback v. Stephens. 77 In his
opinion, Judge Park concludes that:
If any plan of urban county government must fit within the
present general statutory provisions applicable to counties and
cities of the second class, the commission devising the plan
of
78
urban county government may find itself in a strait jacket.
Under this rationale, if one concedes that the legislature intended
actually to authorize a new form of government designed to meet the
goals set forth in KRS § 67A.010, it must have intended that the
urban county government charter not be bound by the existing Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Whether or not the Legislature has actually intended to extend
to urban county governments such a carte blanche is presently an
76KRS
§ 83.010 (emphasis added).
77
No. 31461 (Fayette Cir. Ct. 1972).
781d. at 14.
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unresolved issue. The Court of Appeals' opinion in Pinchbackcertainly
did little to foreclose discussion on the matter. In saying that it was
not convinced that any plan developed under KRS Chapter 67A would
necessarily violate the Constitution, the Court may have merely been
stating that the minimum standard for constitutionality had been
met. On the other hand, the Court could have been suggesting that
most such plans would in all likelihood be unconstitutional and that
the delegation of power under Chapter 67A is more limited than it
appears at first blush. If such was the Court's meaning, however, it
gave no indication of the nature of the factors which require such
limits or of the precise point at which those limits must be set. For
the present, then, all that can be safely concluded regarding the home
rule aspect of KRS Chapter 67A is: (1) that it establishes legislative
home rule for urban counties in Kentucky; (2) that it appears to
involve a delegation of power to local governments much broader than
any heretofore authorized in this state; and (3) that the delineation
of the precise scope of that delegation of power must await future
litigation involving specific plans of urban county government.
II. Crry-CouNTY CoNsou-AmoN

The second noteworthy aspect of KRS Chapter 67A (and by far
the most important) is that it authorizes the voters of every Kentucky
county except those containing first class cities to "merge all units of
city and county government into an urban county government."79 With
this provision, Kentucky joins a growing list of states which offer
city-county consolidation as one solution to the ever-increasing problems of local government.
The history of city-county consolidation in the United States is
separable into two periods, conforming roughly to the 19th and 20th
centuries.8 0 They are respectively: (1) the period of merger by state
action-both constitutional and statutory; and (2) the period of merger
by local referendum81 In the period of merger by state action, all the
successful mergers were accomplished by direct acts of state legislatures or constitutional conventions usually without effort to gain the
consent or advice of the electorate in affected areas.8 2 The more notable
mergers effected during this era involved New Orleans,8 3 Boston,8 4
79 KRS § 67A.010 (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added).
80 Makielski 1.
81
Id.
82

Id.; See, e.g., COLO. CoNsT. art. XX, § 1.
83 1805.
84 1822.
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Philadelphia,8 5 San Francisco, 6 New York,8 7 Denver,8 8 and Honolulu. 89
In the 20th century, the period of merger by referendum, the
number of successful mergers has steadily increased. The list of cities
and counties consolidated by the local electorate includes Baton
Rouge-East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana;90 Hampton-Elizabeth
City County, Virginia; 91 Miami-Dade County, Florida;92 NashvilleDavidson County, Tennessee;9 3 and Jacksonville-Duvall County, FloridaY4 The most recent city-county consolidation, however, does not
follow the modem trend. The merger of Indianapolis and Marion
County, Indiana in 1969 presents a situation unique to this era-a citycounty consolidation achieved solely by the state legislature. 95 In
searching for the factors which prompted the Indiana legislature to
choose this approach it is enlightening to examine the success of the
merger movement in the last 50 years. Between 1921 and 1969, some
31 merger proposals were submitted to voters in various localities
across the country.96 Only seven of these were approved.97 In the
period from 1921 to 1947, not one of the eight proposed mergers was
adopted,9 8 and even in the period between 1947 and 1969, in which
merger proponents claim considerable progress, defeats for merger
proposals out-number victories by more than two to one. 99 It is,
therefore, not difficult to understand why the Indiana legislature
chose the route that it did.
A. Types of City-County Consolidation
In most instances, city-county consolidation involves complete or
nearly complete merger of all branches of the participating governments. 00 This may come about by the abolition of the offices of the
85 1854.

86 1856.
87 1874-1898. The present city of New York was formed during this twentyfour year period by a series of consolidations involving New York City, Brooklyn,
New York County, Kings County, Queens County, and Richmond County.
88 1902.
80 1907.
90 1947.
91 1952.
92 1957.
93 1962.
94 1967.
95 IN. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-9101 to -9507 (Supp. 1970).
g0 Makielski 3-4.
97 Id.
98 Id.

09 Id. In that period seven merger proposals were adopted while fifteen were
rejected.
100 See, e.g., KS §§ 67A.010-.040; TENN. CoDE ANw. 36-3701 to -3725
(1971).
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county government and an assumption of those duties for the entire
merged area by the city government, 10 1 but a merger usually involves
the creation of a new governmental structure that replaces both of
the former ones. 0 2 Some merger statutes, however, do not require
such full participation. For example, while KRS § 67A.010 authorizes
the merger of "all units of city and county government", North Carolina's merger statute' 0 3 merely provides for the consolidation of administrative functions of cities and counties "as far as is practicable."
In addition, at least three merger provisions contemplate or specifically
authorize the consolidation of the county and its principal city to the
exclusion of some or all of the other cities and towns within the
04
county.
A certain degree of confusion has always surrounded the concept
of city-county consolidation, stemming in part from the view that
ordinary city-county consolidation is the same as the separation of a
city from its surrounding county. 10 5 The basis of this misconception is
the idea that once the city was separated from its parent county,
it received all the powers that the county had formerly exercised
within the city limits, thus, in effect, becoming a city and a county
(for example, the City and County of San Francisco).106
The difference between these two variations of city-county consolidation is primarily one of geography. Under city-county separation,
which is currently in operation in Denver, San Francisco, and the recently merged municipalities of Virginia, the area over which the
county has jurisdiction is reduced while the area over which the city
has jurisdiction remains unchanged (although its powers within that
area are increased),107 In contrast, under true consolidation, one
government becomes responsible for exercising all or most of the
powers that were previously held by the city and county governments
and controls the entire area that originally comprised the city and
the county. 08 As a result, "the boundaries between the two units are
101 See PA. CONsT. art. 14, § 13.

102
See, e.g., KRS § 67A.010; TENN. CODE ANN. 36-3071 to -3725.
10
3GEN. STAT. OF N.C. § 153-246 (Supp. 1972).
04
1 FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 148-9101 to -9507 (Supp.
1970); CODE OF VA. § 15.1-1130 (1973).
105 Makielski 1.
106 Id.

Id. One criticism of city-county separation is that
[i]t does have the advantage of removing the responsibility for rural
government from city taxpayers, but unless annexation is permitted, it
also tends to freeze city-county boundaries. If, as in Virginia, cities may
107

annex portions of the county from which they have separated, the fiscal

viability
of the county could be threatened. Lineberry 684-85.
108 Makielski 1; see Dixon, supra note 1, at 63.
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eliminated, and most or all governmental services are provided for
the whole area."109

The distinction between city-county separation and true consolidation would be of only academic interest for those affected by
KRS Chapter 67A if it were not for the language of a portion of the
Fayette Circuit Court's opinion in Pinchback v. Stephens:'10
city-county government can best be illustrated by
examining San Francisco. It is both a city and a county, although
the boundaries of the two entities are coincident. San Francisco
performs the functions of both a county and a city. The functions performed in a particular case determine whether San Francisco is to be viewed as a city or a county. Although chosen by
the same body of voters, the functions of its officers are determined
by the source of their authority, that is whether they are acting in
a particular case as a city official or as a county official. This is
true even in cases in which the official performs both county and
city functions."'
...consolidated

This part of the Circuit Court opinion was adopted verbatim by the
2 and although the
Court of Appeals in its decision in Pinchback,"1
Court did not also adopt the Circuit Court's conclusions based on that

statement, : 13 neither did it reject them.
A second permutation of the city-county consolidation concept,
called the federation, has been employed by several Canadian cities,
but only by the locality of Miami-Dade County in the United
States."14 Under this approach, local governmental functions in the
affected area are allocated between two levels, "with the metropolitan government being assigned certain area wide functions and

local units retaining responsibility for local functions." : 15 In effect,
this arrangement makes Miami-Dade County really more of a microcosm of a home rule state than a truly consolidated metropolitan government.
109 Makielski 1.
110 No. 31461 (Fayette Cir. Ct. 1972).

:11 Id. at 6.
112 484 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Ky. 1972).
113 Judge Park concluded tat since a consolidated government is, like San
Francisco, a city and a county, the city does not cease to exist by reason of the
merger. This conclusion, if ultimately upheld, could have great practical implications for any community electing to operate under KRS Chapter 67A.
14 Lineberry 698. It should be noted, however, that under the North Carolina
merger statute, Section 153-246 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, the
federation structure appears to be quite feasible. Consolidation of administrative
functions "as far as practicable" could well result in merger of various area wide
functions (i.e., education, sanitation) without disturbing the operation of other
local" concerns.
115 Id. For a thorough discussion of the Miami-Dade County governmental
structure see Note, The Urban County: A Study of New Approaches to Local
Government In Metropolitan Areas, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 526 (1960).
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B. Comparative Sources of Merger Authorization
As is the case with home rule powers, the source of authority for
city-county consolidation varies greatly from state to state. In isolated
instances, for example, the authority to merge city and county governments is established in special," 6 self-executing constitutional provisions which delineate both the particular city and county that are
to be merged and the method for doing so." 7 In other, equally rare,
special constitutional provisions, the power of merger is delegated to
the electorates of specified cities to be exercised at their discretion.1 8
More commonly, however, the constitutional provisions authorizing
city-county consolidation are general in nature and are implemented
by special acts which are subsequently submitted to the populace
of the affected area for approval or disapproval. 1 9 For instance,
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution states:
The government of a county and the government of one or more
municipalities located therein may be consolidated into a single
government which may exercise any and all powers of the county
and the several municipalities. The consolidation plan may be
proposed only by special law, which shall become effective if approved by a vote of the electors of the county, or of the county
20
and the municipalities affected as may be provided in the plan.'

Pursuant to this mandate, the Florida legislature appointed a charter
commission in the mid-1960's to devise a plan of consolidation for
Jacksonville-Duvall County. The charter thus drafted was enacted
by the legislature in Chapter 67-1320 of the Florida Statutes of 1967
and was approved by the voters of Duvall County on August 8, 1967.121

City-county consolidation is also authorized in a number of states
by means of a general constitutional provision coupled with a general
implementing statute. 22 In such states, the power to raise the issue
of merger and to devise a charter for the merged government is left

exclusively with the local electorate or its representatives. A good
illustration of this alternative is found in Tennessee where the general
116 The word "special" as used herein, refers to statutes and constitutional
provisions which ertain only to one particular city; "general" provisions, on the
other hand, are those which apply to all cities within a particular classification
alike.
117 CoLo. CoNsT. art. XX, § 1, PA. CONsT. art. 9, § 13.
:LI Mo. CONsT. art. VI, § 30(a).
1 19
1 2 0 FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; GA. CoNST. § 2-7807; ORE. CONST. art. X, § 4.
FLA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 8 (emphasis added).
121 Lineberry 700.
122 See, e.g., MONT.CONST. art. XVI, § 7,REv. CODE OF MoNT. §§ 11-8401 to
-3560 (1968); N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 3; Gm. STAT. OF N.C. § 153-246 (Supp.
1971); TxNN. CoNsT. art. XI, § 9; TENN.CODE ANN.§§ 6-3701 to -3725 (1971).
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constitutional merger provision is implemented by a statute which
23
applies to all cities and counties in the state.
Finally, there are those states which permit consolidation by
statute in the absence of any applicable constitutional provision. In
such states, the legislature's authority to take such action (as is the
case with legislative home rule, supra) stems from the absence of constitutional language prohibiting passage of merger legislation. 124 Both
of the states which have adopted this approach, Indiana and Kentucky,
have enacted general merger statutes, 125 equally applicable to all
cities and counties which fit within their respective confines. It should
be noted, however, that while the Indiana law is technically a general
statute, it is, in spirit and effect, special legislation in that it applies
only to first class cities and was tailored to fit the needs of the only
qualifying locality, Indianapolis-Marion County. 126 KRS Chapter 67A,
in contrast, is truly a statute of general application which, though
perhaps originally introduced with Lexington and other particular
areas of the state in mind, is presently available to every city in this
state except Louisville.
Ill. OTER NOTsWORTY FxATtEs oF CHAPnrm 67A
Beyond the two broad characteristics of KRS Chapter 67A discussed

heretofore, there are three more specific features of the statute which
require further analysis. The effect of these sections, although perhaps
minor in comparison to the overall impact of the statute, may nonetheless be of great practical importance for those seeking to implement
city-county consolidation.
A. KRS 67A applies to "any county except a county containing a city
of the first class... :
Under this provision it would seem that "local governmental
reform" in Kentucky is hardly synonymous with "metropolitan reform." Kentucky has only one truly metropolitan area-Louisville, and
only one other area that could arguably be classified as metropolitanLexington. Section 60 of the Kentucky Constitution defines first class
cities as those with populations of 100,000 or more. Therefore, Louisville, which has a population in excess of 350,000127 is clearly outside
the scope of Chapter 67A, and Lexington, which has a population of
23

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-3701 to -3725 (1971).
124
See note 52, supra; Pincbback v. Stephens, 484 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1972).
25
(
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-9101 to -9507 (Supp. 1970); KRS § 67A.010-.040
1

(Supp.2 6 1972).
'
See Dortch v. Lugar, 226 N.E.2d 25, 30-31 (Ind. 1971).
127 1970 Federal Census.
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over 107,000128 is only within the purview of the statute by virtue of
the General Assembly's failure to reclassify it when its population
reached the prescribed plateau.
In this respect Chapter 67A is an anomoly among consolidation
statutes. In every other state in which the application of merger
laws is or has at one time been restricted according to the size of the
participating units, only the largest cities have been allowed to avail
themselves of the statutes provisions. 129 In Frazer v. Carr,3 0 the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that in restricting the operative scope
of the Tennessee statute to those counties with a population of 200,000
or more, the legislature had acted reasonably because
[wle all know that it is in these large counties that the problem of
the large cities as to the ever increasing population just beyond
limits become more acute, complex, and conthe corporate
131
fusing.
Similarly, in Dortch v. Lugar,13 2 the classification under which only
cities of the first class fall within the scope of Indiana's consolidation
law was found to be rational and valid. 133 Notwithstanding these prior
34
decisions, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Pinchback v. Stephens
declared that:
we think the exclusion of a county containing a first class city has a
rational and reasonable basis in that in such a county the problems
to be overcome in establishing an urban government are more complex by reason of the size of the population and its apportionment
among the various local governmental units. As is the case with
Louisville and Jefferson County, the first class city will ordinarily
be larger in population than the unincorporated territory of the
county; this is not usually the case with any cities of lower classes,
and this distinction furnishes the justification for separate legislative treatment in the area of urban governmental organization.' 35
It is submitted that, in so holding, the Kentucky Court has properly
recognized that population does furnish a reasonable basis for statutory
classification in the area of local government. It seems to have erred,
however, in finding rationality in a particular classification which
128
129

Id.
See, e.g.,

IND. ANN. STAT.

§§ 48-9101 to -9507 (Supp. 1970); ORE.

CONST.

art. X, § 4. In addition, the Tennessee statute when originally enacted applied only
to counties having a population of 200,000 or more. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-3703

(repealed 1963).
130 360 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. 1962).
'3' Id. at 452.
132 266 N.E.2d 25 (Ind. 1971).
133 Id. at 31-32.
'34 484 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1972).
135 Id. at 330.
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denies an important instrument of urban governmental reform to the
areas that need it most.
B. The concluding sentence of KRS f5 67A.020 provides that
[i]f it appears that a majority of those voting are in favor of
adopting the plan, the commissioners shall enter such fact of

record and shall organize the urban county government. (emphasis added).
The "majority" referred to in the foregoing section is "the majority
of those voting in the city and the county together." The Kentucky
statute makes no allowance for a separate polling of the city and
county electorates on the question of merger. Conversely, the merger
provision of the Tennessee Constitution requires that proposed plans
for city-county consolidation be
approved by a majority of those voting within the municipal
corporation and by a majority of those voting in the county out36

side the municipal corporation.'

Florida occupies the middle ground between these two positions by
allowing consolidation proposals to become effective "if approved
by a vote of the electors of the county, or of the county and the
municipal corporation affected, as may be provided in the plan."137
Of the three, the Tennessee position seems to be the soundest since
it alone removes the possibility that the government of a city or a
county might be terminated through merger despite the fact that a
majority of its residents opposed such a move. Still, the Kentucky
provision is probably safe for the present in that the validity of such
a section does not appear to have been challenged elsewhere and the
prospects are not good for a final resolution of the issue by the Kentucky judiciary in the near future.' 38

C. KRS § 67A.040 states:
All powers and privileges possessed by the county and the class of

cities to which the largest city in the county belongs on the date
the urban county government becomes the effective government

shall be exercised by the urban county government. (emphasis
added).
This section conforms to the standard delegation of power to consolidated city-county governments, 39 with one important exception:
IN TENN. CONST. art. XI,
37
1 38 FLA. CONST. art. VIII,

§ 9.

§ 3.

This issue is not a factor in the Lexington-Fayette County merger since approximately 70% of the residents of the city and the county separately and collectively approved the plan.
1

139 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-3711 (1971).
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it can easily be read as permanently restricting the powers of the urban
county government to those available to it when it was originally
created. Again, the law of Tennessee exemplifies the better approach
(in terms of both substance and clarity) by endowing consolidated
cities and counties with "all the powers and duties which cities and
counties have or may hereafter have authorized to them' 40 under the
Constitution and general laws of Tennessee. Despite the apparent
differences in the two statutes, the Kentucky law has already been
interpreted by some as embodying a grant of powers identical to that
under the Tennessee statute. Article 3, Section 3.01 of the charter of
the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government thus boldly asserts
that
[p]ursuant to KRS 67A.040, the Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government shall have all powers and privileges which cities of the
second class are, or may hereafter be authorized or requiredto exercise under the Constitution and general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky ... [and in addition] .. .such other powers
and privileges which counties are, or may hereafter be authorized
or requiredto exercise....141

Whether the Court of Appeals chooses to read KRS § 67A.040 strictly
or decides instead to adopt the more liberal interpretation of the Lexington-Fayette Charter Commission will determine to a large extent
the long-run attractiveness of the concept of urban county government
for Kentucky's cities and counties.
Conclusion

Chapter 67A of the Kentucky Revised Statutes is a forward-looking
statute which, if properly construed, should enable Kentucky to keep
pace in the area of local government reform with even the most
progressive states. It delegates to local electorates not only the power
to initiate governmental reform, but also the power to define the
structure of that reform and the authority to finalize its adoption. The
only serious defect in the statute is that it does not apply to the
largest urban center of the state, which in reality may be the single
area which could benefit the most by its provisions. Even this omission,
however, does not greatly diminish its significance.
Hopefully, the Courts too will recognize the tremendous potential
for positive governmental reform that is encompassed in Chapter 67A
and will refrain from imposing upon it any statutory or constitutional
straight jacket. If they do so refrain, the cities and counties of Ken14

o TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-3711 (1971) (emphasis added).
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Charter art. 3, § 3.01
(1972) (emphasis added).
141
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tucky will thereby move a giant stride closer to finding a permanent
solution to many of their governmental woes.
Addendum
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, on December 28, 1973,142 handed
down a far-reaching decision in Holselaw v. Stephens.143 Therein, the
Court upheld the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Charter in every important respect and enunciated several principles regarding KRS Chapter 67A that should serve to secure firmly the
foundation of the urban county in Kentucky.
Treating first the question of city-county consolidation, the Court
found "nothing in the constitution which requires that subdivisions
of local government be limited to cities and counties" 144 and concluded
that the General Assembly "may . .. establish a new unit of local
government in which are combined the powers of both city and county
governments." 145 In characterizing the urban county, the Court declared:
This new form of government is neither a city government nor a
county government as those forms of government presently exist
but it is an entirely new creature in which are combined all of the
powers of a county government and all the powers possessed by
that class
of cities to which the largest city in the county be6
longs.14
The Court went on to resolve many of the questions left unanswered
by the Pinchback decision 47 by holding that
the adoption of an urban county form of government extinguishes
all city government and all county government, except units and
functions of county government established
by the Constitution,
which theretofore existed in the county.148
As such, neither the city nor its territorial jurisdiction will continue
to exist within the structure of an urban county government.
The Court had more difficulty determining the scope and validity
of the delegation of power to local authorities contained in KRS
Chapter 67A. In resolving this issue it recognized a distinction between the exercise of the legislature's discretion as to "what the law
142 At the date of completion of the foregoing article the decision analyzed
herein had not been rendered. Any discussion of the current status of the urban
county in Kentucky, however, would be incomplete without reference to this case.
143 No. 73-894 (Ky. Ct. App., Dec. 28, 1973).
144 Id. at 11.
145 Id. at 12.
140 Id.
147 See footnote 113 and accompanying text, supra.
148 No. 78-894. at 22.
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shall be"1 49 and the exercise of its discretion "in the administration of
the law itself."150 The Court then concluded that "the authorization
of urban county government and the establishment of its powers was
a legislative enactment within the sole discretion of the General Assembly," 151 and that no authority was, or could be, delegated to affect
the powers and responsibilities of the urban county government which
the legislature so established. In contrast, the Court held that
the structure of urban county government is nothing more than
the machinery by which those powers and responsibilities may be

executed and 15therefore
the authority to provide the structure can
2
be delegated.
It is evident, from an examination of the Charter provisions thereby
upheld, that the Court intends the definition of the word "structure"
as used above to include the whole range of powers conferred upon
local authorities by KRS § 67A.020.
The Court of Appeals in Holsolaw did not, however, adopt the
doctrine of imperio in imperium. Rather, it announced two broad principles which will for the present operate as the practical equivalent of
that concept. 53 First, in resolving the conflict between various charter
provisions and the general laws of the state the Court held that
in enacting KRS § 67A.010-67A.040 it was the intent of the legislature to create urban county government as a separate classification of government and to exempt it as a class from the opera-

tion of general laws relating to city government and county government except those which confer powers upon city and county

governments.

54

In other words, the present laws of the state of Kentucky are inapplicable to urban county governments, and in the absence of general
laws other than KRS Chapter 67A which are applicable to that form
of government, local authorities have virtually a free hand in
structuring local government. Neither, apparently, will this freedom
significantly be restricted by the provisions of the Kentucky Constitution. Indeed, the second of the Court's broad principles, which follows
from the determination that within an urban county government the
149 Id. at 13.
15o Id. at 14.
'51
152
153

Id. at 15.

Id.

The effect of the Court's decision in Holscaw could be eroded by a proliferation of legislation pertaining specifically to urban county governments. Some
proposals in this regard appear almost certain to come before the General Assembly in the current session as a special legislative task force commissioned to
study urban county governments reports its findings and recommendations.
154 No. 73-894, at 20-21.
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city ceases to exist, is that at least some of the provisions of the Constitution which relate to cities will not be extended, even by analogy,
to apply to urban county governments. Thus the Court held Sections
160 (requiring at-large voting for city councilmen) and 246 (limiting
the salaries of certain public officials) inapplicable to the LexingtonFayette Urban County Government.
In this decision, the Court of Appeals refrained from imposing
statutory and constitutional restrictions which could have rendered
KRS Chapter 67A virtually impotent. For this it is to be highly commended. Hopefully, it will adhere to the propositions announced in
Holsclaw in the future litigation than seems certain to arise involving
urban county governments. If the General Assembly in the present
and succeeding sessions accordingly remains devoted to the idea of
self-determination for urban counties and if more communities follow
the lead of Lexington and Fayette County, Kentucky will soon take
a great step toward genuine governmental reform.
William M. Lear, Jr.

